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ABSTRACT 
Establishing motive is central to the analysis of criminal behaviour. This paper 
analyses the range of motives for non-compliant behaviour among coastal cod 
fishermen. A multinomial logit model is employed to analyse the reasons that 
underlie various motives. The four motives compared in this study are economic, 
technological and social, and motives caused by bureaucracy and legitimacy 
problems. The economic motive is found to be most important for coastal fishermen. 
However, the cross-sectional data indicate that motives vary with fishing gear, vessel 
length, and fishermen’s age. The results indicate that identifying motives for non-
compliant behaviour is not straightforward but is important for reducing the extent of 
infringements of the regulations. Fishermen who use gill-net, seine and long line, for 
example, are more often motivated to non-compliance by technical problems and 
bureaucracy than hand-jig fishers. The study suggests that in order to prevent non-
compliance behaviour, the authorities’ management policy should be designed to 
address the problems encountered by different categories of fishers. For example, 
offences that are committed because of technical problems should be resolved by 
increasing the involvement of fishermen in the process of drawing up regulations, 
whereas offences motivated by economic factors should be reduced by increasing 
inspections. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Fish resources are managed by the authorities in order to achieve sustainable 
development of the fish stocks. In the EU, illegal catches have long been a serious 
management problem (Holden, 1996), and fisheries managers consider ways to 
improve fishermen’s compliance with regulations. Evaluating motivation is 
important as a step towards preventing illegal behaviour. Non-compliance, for 
example, might be a result of lack of enforcement and punishment (Becker, 1968; 
Sutinen and Andersen, 1985). Lack of perceived fairness and appropriateness of the 
regulations may also play a role in motivating non-compliance (Tyler, 1990; Jentoft, 
1989; Nielsen 2003). In any case, it is vital that the authorities should understand the 
motives that cause illegal behaviour in their search for effective policies to prevent 
non-compliance. 
The literature on compliance in fisheries addresses economic, social behavioural, 
legitimacy, and moral factors for non-compliance (Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; 
Hatcher et al, 2000; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2003; Jentoft, 2000; Hønneland, 1999). 
A shortcoming of the existing literature is that technological reasons for non-
compliance have scarcely been addressed at all. Squires, (1987), Kirkley and Strand 
(1988), Dupont (1991) Squires and Kirkley (1991, 1996), Jensen (2002) address that 
constraints of fishing technology have consequences for obtaining successful 
management in multispecies fishery. In this view the characteristics of fishing gears 
impose restriction on the fishermen’s ability to comply with regulation. Gill net and 
trawl, for example, are often inappropriate for the selective harvesting of demersal 
species (Kirkley and Strand, 1988; Alam, Ishak and Squires, 1996, 2002), and the 
technological ability to harvest selectively has implications for the ability to obey by-
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catch regulations. Obeying regulations may thus depend on the technological 
characteristics of the fishing technology employed. 
The study makes two contributions to the literature. First, competing explanations 
that have their roots in different paradigms are tested for their contribution for 
explaining non-compliance among fishermen. Secondly, technological problems that 
create incentives for infringements are explicitly tested for, which to the best of our 
knowledge is a topic that has not been addressed before. We perform an empirical 
analysis of the motives for non-compliance, based on fishermen’s choices among 
alternative explanations of why the regulations are violated. A multinomial logit 
model is used to analyse the responses of the fishers. The objective is to identify 
ways for the authorities to reduce non-compliance. The following section reviews a 
number of theories regarding the motivation of non-compliance behaviour. The 
empirical model used to analyse the motives for non-compliance is outlined in 
section III. Data and empirical results are presented in sections IV and V. A 
discussion of the findings and some policy implications for reducing non-compliance 
are presented in the final section. 
II. MOTIVES FOR NON-COMPLIANCE  
Several scholars have carried out empirical analyses of non-compliance among 
fishermen (e.g. Sutinen, Rieser and Gauvin, 1990; Furlong, 1991; Sutinen and 
Kuperan, 1999; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Hatcher et al., 2000, 2005; Nielsen and 
Mathiesen, 2003). A review of the literature shows that several theories are used for 
explaining non-compliance in fisheries, the theories are founded on different 
paradigms employed for explaining human behaviour and have origins in research 
fields of economics (Becker, 1968), psychology (Kohlberg, 1976) and sociology 
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(Tyler, 1990).2 A downside of superfluous of theories is that it becomes difficult for 
management authorities to decide which strategy to employ in order to reduce 
infringements of regulations. Motives for non-compliance among fishermen differs 
with backgrounds variables, for example, regional differences, differences between 
fishing gear, vessel size, and attitudes towards regulation, etc. We employ a 
multinomial logit model to reveal distinctions in motives for non-compliance among 
fishers. The procedure systemises information on fishermen’s explanations for 
infringement behaviour with backgrounds variables of demography, firm-related 
factors and attitude factors. Another advantage of the procedure is that explanations 
for non-compliance founded on theories from fields of economics, sociology and 
psychology is tested empirically against each other.  
Different motives for non-compliance behaviour are outlined in a questionnaire 
presented for the fishermen, and the individual respondents are asked to choose the 
motive that is most appropriate for them for explaining non-compliance behaviour 
(Table 1). 
The first motive outlined is based on the premise that economic reasoning is a 
driving force for non-compliance behaviour. Becker (1968) suggests that utility-
maximizing individuals might find it optimal to commit a criminal offence when the 
expected utility from committing the crime exceeds the utility from engaging in legal 
activity. Economic reasoning is used to explain non-compliance among fishermen 
(Sutinen and Andersen, 1985; Furlong, 1991). 
The second option build on that technological conditions of different types of fishing 
gear have implications for fishermen’s ability to comply with the regulations, and 
therefore technological problems as such is explaining the non-compliance behaviour 
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(Squires, 1987; Kirkley and Strand, 1988). The technology of gill-nets, for example, 
makes it difficult for the fisherman to comply with by-catch regulations and quota 
regulations (Alam, Ishak, Squires 1996; Thunberg, Bresnyan, Adams 1995). This is 
due to the fact that several species are harvested simultaneously, and the gill-net are 
an inefficient gear for selective harvesting. Non-compliance with by-catch 
regulations is also a problem for fishermen using trawl (Nielsen and Mathiesen, 
2003).  
The third is option is that non-compliance by among fellow fishermen is a main 
motivator for non-compliance of the individual fishermen. The significance of 
imitating others behaviour is founded on the theory of social behaviour, which 
emphasises how individual behaviour is influenced by opinions that are formed 
within a group. In this perspective the opinions of peers has a key influence via the 
moral context of the actual decisions taken at sea by fishermen (Sutinen and 
Kuperan, 1999, Sutinen and Gauvin, 1988).  
Finally, the bureaucracy of regulations is a suggested as reason for infringement 
behaviour. The argument is that fishermen’s perceptions of legitimacy and fairness 
of the regulations have an impact on compliance (Tyler, 1990; Jentoft, 2000; 
Hønneland, 1999; Nielsen, 2003). In this view, fishermen regard regulations as 
unfair, bureaucratic, and the law and its institutions as inappropriate, and thus as 
incentives for non-compliance.  
The questionnaire form, where the respondents have to choose between alternative 
explanations for infringement behaviour, has the advantage that it gives the 
possibility for performing a systematic empirical analysis. The applied outcome 
choices for non-compliance denote an exhaustive representation of motives for 
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infringement behaviour based on the literature and relevant for the applied case study 
of the Norwegian coastal cod fishery.3 A drawback of questionnaire form applied is 
that it requires a narrowing of definitions of the motives for non-compliance, but this 
is obtained to the benefit of providing sufficient observations to undertake an 
empirical analysis.  
An important part of the analysis of the motives is to find explanatory factors that 
discriminate among motivation groups. Additional information on the respondents 
that can be broken down into demographic factors (age, member of fishery 
association, position in the firm, etc.), firm-related factors (number of fishing days, 
number of fishing permits, region, etc.) and attitude factors are collected. Information 
of value for understanding the underlying mechanisms for non-compliance is 
obtained by combining knowledge of motives and explanatory factors. These 
mechanisms are important as a means of suggesting options to reduce non-
compliance for different categories of fishermen. Policy instruments that affect 
economic incentives, for example, might be important as a means of motivating 
fishermen to comply with economic conditions, whereas conditions that affect 
legitimacy problems might be the key to reduce non-compliance among fishermen 
that regard the regulatory climate as too bureaucratic. 
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The respondents’ choices of alternative motives are modelled by a multinomial logit 
model. The respondents chose from J alternative motives (outcomes), which are 
indexed j=0,…J. The outcomes cannot be ranked in any way, and the multinomial 
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logit model is a suitable modelling device.4 The model for determining the 
probability of outcome j is: 
1) 
1
exp( )
Pr ( | )
1 exp( )
i j
ij i J
k i
k
x
y j x
x


=
= =
+
,
where Prij(yi = jxi) denotes the probability that individual i chooses outcome j. xi
represents exogenous variables, and j are the parameters to be estimated. The 
multinomial logit model is based on the assumption of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) meaning that the odds ratio between any two choices is unaffected 
by any other alternative choice.5 The IIA assumption is tested by determining 
whether the odds ratio between each pair of alternatives is impacted, when 
observations of other alternative choice are eliminated from the estimation (Long, 
1997). Rejection of the assumption of independence means that biased predictions of 
probabilities will be obtained by the multinomial logit model.  
The impact of individual regressors on the odds ratio is not obtained in (1), but these 
marginal effects are derived by differentiation:  
2) 
0
Pr
Pr [ Pr ] Pr [ ]
J
ij
ij j ik k ij j
kix
   
=

=  = 
 
IV. DESCRIPTION OF DATA  
A questionnaire is administered to coastal fishermen holding licenses for catching 
cod, saithe, and haddock in the coastal fishery. Three hundred randomly selected 
respondents have answered the questionnaire based on telephone interviews. In order 
to secure a high likehood an honest responses assurance of individual anonymity and 
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8
confidentiality is provided. The questionnaire is designed in a form and wording that 
should obtain accurate responses, the accuracy is of particular importance with 
respect to the choice between different motives for non-compliance. In the study 
none of the 300 respondents have failed to respond on what motivates non-
compliance behaviour. 
The coastal fishermen in Norway are harvesting several species, and their motives 
for non-compliance may differ, depending on which species is mainly targeted. For 
example, the probability that a respondent indicates that regulation is bureaucratic 
might depend on whether the fisherman is referring to the herring fishery or to the 
cod fishery. This study focuses on the cod fishery, because this fishery is most 
valuable in terms of income for the coastal fleet. The 245 respondents analysed are 
those fishermen indicating that cod is the most important species for them, and that 
regulation of cod has a larger influence on earnings than any other species.  
The summary statistics indicate that the majority of fishermen 63.5% (N=154) 
identify economic motives for cheating, 18% a technical reason, 6.6% the 
importance of other fishermen’s behaviour, and 12.3% that bureaucracy is their 
reason for non-compliance (Table 2). 
The demographic information indicates that the mean age of the respondents is 52 
years, and that they are employed as skippers. The firm-related information reveals 
that most of the vessels involved operate for about 200 days a year, the average 
vessel length is 12.8 metres, the average crew size is two, and most companies are 
individually owned.  
Four types of fishing gear are used in the coastal cod fishery: gill-net, Danish seine, 
long line, and hand jig. The summary statistics shows that hand jig fishermen are less 
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likely to identify technical and bureaucratic explanations for non-compliance than 
fishermen using other types of gear. The long-line fishermen are less likely to point 
at the influence of others as a motive for cheating. Some coastal fishermen also use 
purse seine gear, but respondents using this gear type target mainly herring, and they 
are not included.  
Four regions of Norway are surveyed: the counties of Finnmark, Troms, Nordland, 
and the southern region. An interesting observation is that fishermen from Troms and 
the southern region seem more likely to refer to the bureaucracy motive as an 
explanation for non-compliance than fishermen from Finnmark and Nordland.  
Attitude factors are measured by Likert variables, which reveal the opinions of 
respondents to regulatory issues. The attitude variables are based on responses on 
multiple-choice answers of the form: “I agree with the statement”, “I partly agree 
with the statement”, “I am neutral to the statement”, “I partly disagree with the 
statement”, or “I disagree with the statement”, which are scored on a scale of 1 to 5.6
The attitude variables are designed to into account the respondents’ perceptions of 
different aspects of the regulations and control of the fishery. Among the aspects 
addressed are attitudes towards regulation of the fishery, personal experience of 
fishery regulations, perceptions of the fisheries authorities, and attitudes towards 
cheating in the fishery. The attitudes variables are important for a deeper 
understanding of the motives for non-compliance. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
A multinomial logit model is employed (Table 3). Maximum likelihood estimation is 
employed for estimating the model. The model is based on demographic and firm-
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related factors and attitude factors. The regressors are exogenous with respect to the 
respondent’s decision on what motivates non-compliance behaviour.7
Factors that are not significant at the p=0.10 level are removed. A likelihood ratio 
(LR) test testing the hypothesis, H0: i = 0 for all , is performed. The test statistic is 
defined as 2(L1 –L0), where L0 is the value of the log-likelihood function when the 
only explanatory variable is the constant term, and L1 is the log-likelihood value 
when all explanatory variables are included. The test statistics rejects the H0-
hypothesis (H0: i = 0) in model, indicating that the variables contribute to explaining 
the differences in motives for non-compliance. Moreover, the IIA assumption is 
confirmed, meaning that the odds of any two choices are independent of the other 
choices.  
The model includes three demographic and firm-related factors: fishermen older than 
50 years, vessel’s length in metres, and fishermen using hand jig fishing gear. The 
age of the fishermen is not statistically significant, but grouping the data between 
fisherman younger and older than 50 years of age is found to be significant. With 
respect to fishing gear, different gear types have been tested, and the data indicate 
that the hand jig differs from the other gear types. Several other demographic firm-
related factors are tested but none of them contributed to explaining differences in 
motives for non-compliance. To this end it is interesting to observe that regional 
distinctions in motives for non-compliance are not statistically demonstrated in the 
data. Several of the attitude factors are significant in explaining motives for non-
compliance, and these factors are included.  
The individual effects of the demographic, firm-related, and attitudes variables are 
obtained by estimating their marginal effects (Table 4). Several interesting findings 
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are made. The marginal effects indicate that fishermen using hand jig gear are less 
likely to point to technical and bureaucracy problems as motivations for non-
compliance than fishermen using other types of gear. The result is valuable in that it 
demonstrates that the fishing technology employed influences the motivation for 
infringement of the regulations. The results indicate that economic incentives should 
be used to reduce non-compliance among hand jig fishermen. For the fishermen 
using seine, gill net and long line the authorities should employ means that address 
economic motivation, but also means that are directed towards motives based on 
technology and bureaucratic frustration. 
A weak indication is found for that fishermen on larger vessels are less likely to 
identify bureaucracy as their motive for non-compliance (Table 4). The vessel length 
is, however, statistically insignificant a result that follows due to multicollinearity in 
the model. Spearman’s rank test justifies the significant correlations between vessel 
length and the following attitude factors: 1) perceived fairness of regulation, 2) 
perceived probability of a control of papers being conducted, 3) perceived 
probability that fishermen in general are cheating. Moreover fishermen older than 50 
are less likely to identify technical conditions as reason for non-compliance 
behaviour.  
Turning to the attitude factors, the perceived probability that the public managers 
conduct paper control is perceived being lower among fishermen that are pointing at 
economic motives for non-compliance compared to fishermen pointing at other 
motives (Table 4). The result confirms that low risk of being controlled creates an 
economic motive for non-compliance. It is also interesting that fishermen that point 
at economic motives for non-compliance have a low trust in that regulation is 
perceived as fair among fishermen in general. The economic-oriented fishermen also 
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anticipate the lowest rate of infringement among fishermen in general. The fishermen 
that are motivated by economic factors also have a low trust in that increased 
involvement of fishermen in the regulatory process will reduce non-compliance. The 
analysis reveals that fishermen that point at the economic motive for non-compliance 
are more likely to be influenced by increased control measures than fishermen that 
point at other motives for non-compliances.  
Fishermen that point at technical reasons for non-compliance are most negative 
towards the discard of useful fish. A relatively positive attitude towards regulation is 
found among fishermen who emphasise technical motives for non-compliance. They 
are more likely to believe that the regulations are perceived as fair by fishermen, and 
that there is a higher probability of their papers being inspected than among 
fishermen who refer to the economic motive. For the authorities, it is important to 
realise that fishermen who mention technical grounds for non-compliance have a 
positive attitude to the involvement of fishermen in the regulation process in order to 
reduce non-compliance. 
The fishermen who identify non-compliance among fellow fishermen as a reason for 
non-compliance are relatively negative to the idea that the authorities are managing 
the fisheries properly. They believe that non-compliance among fishermen is more 
common than is thought by the fishermen who pointing to economic and 
bureaucratic motives for non-compliance. Finally, about 12% of the fishermen point 
at the regulations as an explanation for non-compliance. These fishermen mainly use 
Danish seine, long line and gill net, and have the lowest belief that targeting other 
species than cod might help to reduce non-compliance. The reason might be that to 
using these types of fishing gear makes it is difficult to catch other species than cod. 
One might expect increasing the engagement of fishermen in the regulatory process 
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to reduce frustration with bureaucracy as a motive for non-compliance, but this does 
not seem to be case. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The paper addresses the influence of various motives for non-compliance among 
coastal cod fishermen in Norway. The cross-sectional data show that there are 
various motives for non-compliance among coastal fishermen. The economic motive 
for non-compliance is important for most fishermen, a finding that is in line with the 
results of studies performed by Hatcher et al. (2000, 2005), Nielsen and Mathiesen 
(2003), and Sutinen, Rieser and Gauvin (1990). Individual economic conditions play 
an important role in determining the motives that lead to infringement of the 
regulations. In particular, we find that fishermen who emphasise economic motives 
believe in a lower likelihood that their papers will be inspected than fishermen who 
explain non-compliance in terms of non-economic motives. However, increasing 
fishery control has often been found to be a relatively costly way to achieve 
compliance (Arnason, Hannesson and Shrank, 2000). For this reason, increasing the 
involvement of fishermen in the regulatory process is often suggested as a means of 
reducing non-compliance. This study indicates that increased involvement of 
fishermen is likely to have a low probability of success among economy-oriented 
fishermen, compared to fishermen who identify technical reasons for non-
compliance. The result is interesting because scholars have discussed whether means 
that affect economic incentives, legitimacy or technical problems should be 
employed to reduce non-compliance. Our findings suggest that involving fishermen 
in the regulatory process would reduce non-compliance among some fishermen, 
whereas economic conditions might be expected to influence the majority of 
fishermen. 
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The study is based on the premise that fishermen cannot be regarded as a 
homogeneous group, since harvesting patterns differ among fishermen, depending on 
regional differences in fishing fields and abundance of fish, differences in harvesting 
gears, which means that perceptions of regulation and motives for non-compliance 
also differ among fishers. The study shows that type of fishing gear plays a 
significant role in explaining differences in motives for non-compliance among 
coastal fishermen. Empirical studies by Squires (1987), Kirkley and Strand (1988) 
show that gear is crucial for determining production conditions and the ability to 
adjust to regulation. The present study shows that catch technology also plays an 
important role in explaining differences in motives for infringing the regulations. 
More specifically, we find that hand jig fishermen are less likely to suggest that 
bureaucracy and technical problems motivate non-compliance than fishermen who 
use Danish seine, gill-net and long line. The use of a particular technology influences 
fishermen’s perception of regulations, in that it appears that hand jig fishermen 
perceive a higher degree of fairness of regulation than fishermen who use other types 
of gear. Their somewhat positive attitude to regulation explains the lower percentage 
of hand jig fishermen who use bureaucracy as their explanation for non-compliance 
compared with fishermen who use other types of gear. If we wish to understand what 
causes the differences in motives, it is also important to note that hand jig fishermen 
have fewer problems in avoiding by-catch than fishermen using Danish seine and 
long line.8 Moreover, fishermen who use other gear types than hand jig indicate that 
periodic (temporal) regulation is the problem, while hand jig fishermen are relatively 
more concerned with regulation of minimum fish size.9
It is also interesting to note that our data do not allow us to establish regional 
differences in motives for non-compliance. We anticipated that the differences in 
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composition of harvested species and differences in fishing fields along the 
Norwegian coast, a distance of 2000 kilometres, would have produced different 
motives for non-compliance in different regions. However, the fact that most 
respondents are operating in the three northernmost counties of Norway (Finnmark, 
Troms and Nordland) under much the same harvesting conditions might explain the 
lack of regional differences in the data.10 
Eighteen percent of the fishermen identify technical problems as the reason for non-
compliance. These fishermen mainly use gill net, long line and Danish seine, and 
regard discard of useful fish as an important regulation issue. Information on how 
regulative obstacles are perceived by fishermen who use different gears is important 
if fishermen are to be involved in the regulatory process. The survey indicates that 
long-line, Danish seine and gill net fishermen suffer from different technical 
problems; for example, 40% of long-line and 28% of Danish seine fishermen regard 
bycatch as a major regulation obstacle, whereas mesh size seems to be a problem for 
gill net fishermen mentioned by 26 % of this group.  
Forty percent of the respondents who mention bureaucracy as an explanation for 
non-compliance stress that periodical quota regulation is an obstacle. These 
fishermen mainly use Danish seine, long line and gill net. It seems that regulations 
are linked to a low faith in the possibility that orienting their catch strategy towards 
other species might reduce non-compliance. This result might follow because these 
fishermen have limited possibilities of switching their catch strategy. Periodical 
regulation is regarded as being unnecessarily restrictive. It is also interesting to note 
that fishermen who regard the regulations as bureaucratic do not believe that 
increased involvement of fishermen in the regulatory process would alleviate the 
situation. This attitude might stem from these fishermen’s lack of faith in being heard 
Page 15 of 24
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
16
in the management process (Jentoft, 2000). Finally, it is remarkable that the 
fishermen who are most sceptical about public control of the fishery are the small 
minority who identify non-compliance among fellow fishermen as a motive for the 
non-compliance conducted by them. On second thoughts, however, this result is 
perhaps not so surprising, in that it suggests that these fishermen would probably 
recommend greater government control of their fellow fishermen. 
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Table 1. Motives for non-compliance with regulations among fishers 
Question: In your opinion, what is the most important reason for non-compliance with 
regulations 
1. One has to disobey the regulations in order to obtaining a reasonable income from fishing 
2. Technical problems make it difficult to comply with the regulations  
3. Because other fishermen are cheating  
4. Because the regulations are bureaucratic  
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Table 2. Summary statistics for respondents on the survey for the coastal cod fishery in 
Norway 
 Economy
(N=154)
Technical 
problem
(N=45)
Others 
cheating
(N=16)
Bureaucracy
(N=30)
Total
(N=245)
Demographic 
Average age  52 years 50 years 48 years 53 years 52 years
Position in firm      
Skipper 98 % 97 % 100 % 100 % 98 %
Firm-related 
Mean fishing days 200 days 207 days 201 days 196 days 201 days
Mean vessel length 12.6 m 13.4 m 15.7 m 11.5 m 12.8 m
Mean crew size 1.9 men 2.3 men 2.6 men 1.8 men 2.0 men
Corporate form 
Single ownership 77 % 73 % 50 % 83 % 75 %
Gear  % 
Gill-net 59.1 20.0 8.2 12.7 = 100 %
Danish seine 55.3 18.4 10.5 15.8 = 100 %
Long line 60.5 25.6 0.0 14.0 = 100 %
Hand Jig 77.8 9.3 5.6 7.4 = 100 %
Region  % 
Finnmark 64.3 19.0 7.1 9.5 = 100 %
Troms 55.0 20.0 8.3 16.7 = 100 %
Nordland 69.0 18.0 5.0 8.0 = 100 %
Southern regions1) 58.1 16.3 7.0 18.6 = 100 %
1) Southern regions include the counties: Nord-Trøndelag, Sør-Trøndelag, Møre and 
Romsdal, Sogn og Fjordane, Hordaland, Rogaland, Vest-Agder. 
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Table 3. Estimates made using the multinomial logit model 
 
Outcome 1 
Economy 
Outcome 2 
Techn. Probl. 
Outcome 3 
Other cheat 
Outcome 4 
Bureaucracy 
Constant   -3.813** 
(-2.73) 
-3.967* 
(-1.90) 
-2.226 
(-1.35) 
Age_50  -0.952** 
(-2.32) 
-1.327** 
(-1.99) 
0.402 
(0.85) 
Meter  -0.042 
(-0.95) 
0.073 
(1.21) 
-0.084** 
(-1.51) 
Hand Jig  -1.342** 
(-2.16) 
-0.323 
(-0.38) 
-1.266** 
(-2.09) 
1. Attitude to public 
control 
 0.136 
(0.88) 
-0.392 
(-1.63) 
0.134 
(0.80) 
2. Attitude to discard  -0.294** 
(-2.10) 
-0.138 
(-0.51) 
0.299 
(1.21) 
3. Fishermen perceive 
regulation as fair 
0.016** 
(2.44) 
0.032** 
(3.07) 
0.010 
(1.43) 
4. Perceived risk of 
papers being checked 
 0.019** 
(2.47) 
0.018 
(1.55) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
5. Attitude towards 
cheating of fishermen 
 0.090** 
(3.23) 
0.099** 
(3.17) 
0.055 
(1.69) 
6. Attitude towards 
fishermen’s involvement 
 0.572** 
(2.34) 
0.099 
(0.30) 
0.175 
(0.82) 
7. Harvesting of 
alternative species 
 0.074 
(0.33) 
-0.019 
(-0.06) 
-0.471** 
(-2.47) 
LR test on all variables 2(9)1) = 97.65*
IIA Test  14.41* 9.69* 11.76* 11.79* 
Note. Reference outcome 1 (economy). For outcome 1 the economics are used as a comparison group. 
Note. ** indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. Figures in 
parenthesis are the t-statistics. 
1) A LR test with H0: i = 0.
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Table 4. Marginal effects  
 
Outcome 1 
Economy 
Outcome 2 
Technical 
problem 
Outcome 3 
Other cheating 
Outcome 4 
Bureaucracy 
Age_50 0.105 
(1.56) 
-0.122** 
(-2.29) 
-0.041 
(-1.63) 
0.058 
(1.41) 
Meter 0.009 
(1.31) 
-0.004 
(-0.78) 
0.002 
(1.41) 
-0.007 
(-1.50) 
Hand Jig 0.202** 
(3.30) 
-0.114** 
(-2.61) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.086** 
(-2.30) 
1. Attitude to public 
control 
-0.016 
(-0.67) 
0.016 
(0.88) 
-0.012* 
(-1.74) 
0.012 
(0.77) 
2. Attitude to discard 0.008 
(0.32) 
-0.039** 
(-2.37) 
-0.003 
(-0.47) 
0.034 
(1.51) 
3. Fishermen perceive 
regulation as fair 
-0.003** 
(-2.67) 
0.001** 
(2.16) 
0.0008** 
(2.43) 
0.0006 
(0.93) 
4. Perceived risk of 
papers being checked 
-0.002** 
(-3.01) 
0.002** 
(2.47) 
0.0004 
(1.26) 
-0.00001 
(-0.02) 
5. Attitude towards 
cheating of fishermen 
-0.015** 
(-3.08) 
0.009** 
(2.92) 
0.002** 
(1.97) 
0.003 
(1.19) 
6. Attitude towards 
fishermen’s involvement 
-0.074** 
(-2.19) 
0.066** 
(2.37) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.008 
(0.39) 
7. Harvesting of 
alternative species 
0.030 
(0.95) 
0.016 
(0.63) 
0.0006 
(0.07) 
-0.048** 
(-2.60) 
Note. ** indicates significance at 5% level, and * indicates significance at the 10% level. 
Figures in parenthesis are t-values.
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1 Suggestions by an anonymous referee have substantially improved the paper. Communication with Stein Arne 
Rånes is greatly appreciated. The authors wish to acknowledge the financial support of the Research Council of 
Norway. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not to be attributed to the Research 
Council. 
2 Sutinen and Kuperan (1999), Hønneland (1999) provide an enriched theoretical introduction to the literature 
applied for explaining non-compliance in fishery. 
3 The applied outcomes are designed to cover the most likely explanations for non-compliance behaviour among 
Norwegian costal fishers and for securing accuracy in responses, we have formulated the motives in a wording to 
be well understood by the fishermen. None of the respondents failed to decide on what motivates non-
compliance behaviour.  
4 Choices that cannot be ranked in any way are denoted as unordered (see Amemiya, 1981). 
5 An example of rejection of the IIA in the literature is obtained in the red bus/blue bus example, where the odds 
of transportation choice between car and red bus will be affected when transportation with a blue bus is added as 
an option. The red and blue buses are naturally close substitutes, and therefore the odds between red bus and car 
will be reduced, when the blue bus is added as an option (McFadden, 1974). 
6 The Likert variable is used as a device for transforming attitudes with categories like strongly approve, 
approve, undecided, disapprove, and strongly disapprove into quantitative variable with numeric values between  
1 and 5 (Likert, 1932). 
7 A referee suggests that a Hausman test might provide a suitable device for testing the exogeneity of the 
regressors. The procedure builds on the use of exogenous instruments that are correlated with the regressors 
without being correlated with the regressant. Unfortunately, those instruments are not at hand, which prevents us 
from performing the suggested test.       
8 33% of the fishermen using hand jig mention that avoiding bycatch in the cod fishery is not easy, for seine and 
long line the percentages are 65% and 53% respectively. 
9 The questionnaire also reveals that periodical regulation is regarded as a problem for 29% of fishermen not 
using hand jig, but is regarded as a problem by only 9 % of the fishermen using hand jig. On the other hand, 
while 27% of the hand jig fishermen mention that minimum size is an important regulatory problem, this issue is 
only mentioned by 7 % of other fishers.  
10 Eighty-two of the respondents operate in the Counties of Finnmark, Troms and Nordland.  
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